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Abstract. In the first Snapshot in the philosophy of perception, we
tackle the question of whether there are sounds in a vacuum. The
answer depends heavily on the metaphysics one is willing to accept.
On theonehand, Berkeleypoints out that there arenoempirical, per-
ceptual grounds to settle the issue. On the other hand, realists try to
provide reasons to address the question. Mechanistic philosophers
believe that thereareno sounds inavacuum,becausenosoundwaves
can be found there. Casati and Dokic claim that there are sounds in
a vacuum, because they are to be identified with the vibrations of
the sound source. O’Callaghan denies the existence of sounds in a
vacuum: he submits that the presence of a medium is a necessary
condition for the existence of sounds even though he doesn’t iden-
tify sounds with sound waves. In what follows, we briefly examine
these approaches.
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In the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in opposition to Sceptics
and Atheists, Hylas, a fictional realist philosopher who debates Berkeley’s alter-
ego Philonous, presents a peculiar argument about sounds: “They don’t inhere
in the sounding bodies. We know this, because when a bell is struck in a vac-
uum, it sends out no sound. So the subject of sound must be the air”1. Some
contemporary philosophers add some details to the thought experiment2. For
example, Casati and Dokic ask us to imagine “a vacuum jar which has the prop-
erty of immediately creating a vacuum upon closing the lid and of immediately
recalling air upon opening the lid. Take now a sounding object like a tuning fork
at 440Hz and have it vibrate, supposing that vibration fades and become inaudi-
ble after 10 seconds. What you hear is an A that becomes feebler and feebler
until it disappears. Now, place the tuning fork inside the jar, have it vibrate ad
before, and repeatedly open-and-close the lid of the jar, say once in a bit less
than a second”3. The main difference between the two thought experiments is
that Hylas focuses on thewaves traveling in the air, while Casati andDokic focus
on the vibrating tuning fork. This difference depends mainly on historical rea-
sons. In the eighteenth century, the standardmechanistic view was that sounds
are vibrations of the medium (air or water) between emitting bodies and listen-
ers, while contemporary distal theories give a prominent role to the resonating
source.
According to Hylas and the mechanistic view, there are no sounds in a vac-
uum, because no vibrations of themedium can be found there. Berkeley rejects
Hylas’ statement. First, Philonous points out that it is curious to maintain that
sounds are vibrations, because vibrations are normally perceived thanks to the
senses of touch and sight, not through hearing. This is not a very strong argu-
ment. Although it is true that somemechanistic approaches describe vibrations
as the proper objects of both hearing and touch, they are compatible with the
idea that the two sensory modalities can be distinguished by the different sense
organs that elaborate those vibrations, namely, the ears and the skin. To be sure,
Berkeley’s real target is the thesis according to which soundsmay exist indepen-
dently of any perceiver4. Indeed, his metaphysics is based on the principle that
we are allowed to claim that something exists only in the presence of empirical,
perceptual evidence. To understand this point, we have to approach the sec-
ond argument offered by Philonous against Hylas. Berkeley rejects the distinc-
tion endorsed by Hylas between real sounds, which may exist even if nobody
1Berkeley (1713, p. 8).
2They are thought experiments because no human being has created or encountered a perfect
vacuum so far.
3Casati and Dokic (2010).
4For a more detailed exposition of Berkeley’s arguments against materialism and realism, see
Togni (2017).
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perceives them, and sounds as we perceive them. Of course, Berkeley cannot
prove that non-perceived sounds don’t exist, but he correctly points out that the
burden of the proof is on his opponent to show that there are such “real”, pos-
sibly non-perceived sounds and that those “real” sounds are lacking in a vac-
uum. Berkeley’s argument holds because it is the realist who is affirming the
positive thesis that sounds can exist independently of any perceiver. As shown
by the question about the existence of sounds in a vacuum, realists try to de-
velop a theoretical view of the metaphysical existence of sounds (and of other
perceptual entities or events), but pay less attention to what is perceptually ex-
perienced. While Hylas claims that there are no sounds in the absence of a vi-
brating medium, Philonous and Berkeley submit that it is not possible to know
whether there are sounds in a vacuum, because we lack empirical evidence to
answer the question5. Berkeley holds the straightforward view that we cannot
say anything about the metaphysical existence of sounds that are not heard. Of
course, it is possible to study what happens to the bell, what is the relation be-
tween its vibrations and the vacuum, and so on, but these considerations don’t
say too much about the existence or non-existence of sounds in a vacuum: this
last point can be settled only at the empirical level, which, in the thought ex-
periment submitted by Hylas, is lacking. Thus, Berkeley’s view is not that Hylas’
mechanistic position on the non-existence of sounds in a vacuum is wrong, but
that it cannot be empirically verified or falsified.
While Berkeley doesn’t discuss theories that locate sounds near the vibrat-
ing body, it is fair to assume that he would move against them the same criti-
cisms that he moves against Hylas. To claim or deny that a vibrating body emits
a sound in a vacuum is to try to address themetaphysical question about the ex-
istence of sounds theoretically rather than empirically. From a Berkeleyan per-
spective, the fact that we know that a body is vibrating in a vacuum doesn’t tell
anything about the existence or non-existence of a sound that is not heard.
Some contemporary philosophers who defend a distal theory of sounds as
events located at their source6 reject Berkeley’s stance and try to give reasons to
accept or deny the idea according to which there are sounds in a vacuum. This
is clearly shown by the debate between Casati and Dokic on the one hand, and
O’Callaghan on the other.
Casati and Dokic consider the presence of the air, or of another medium, as
a non-necessary condition for the existence of a sound. Even if the air is re-
quired to bring information from the vibrating object to the ears and to reveal
5First, a perfect vacuum has never been created. Second, if a perfect vacuum were created, one
would hear sounds or she wouldn’t: whatever the outcome, philosophers wouldn’t be allowed to
draw theoretical conclusions regarding “real” sounds that may exist in the absence of perceivers.
According to Berkeley, giving the senses the last word is the best strategy when it comes to meta-
physics. Thus, if sounds were heard in a vacuum, then they would exist as perceived sounds.
6In this paper, we don’t address proximal and a-spatial theories of sounds.
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sounds to perceivers, it is not essential for the existence of sounds7. Instead,
O’Callaghan supports a relational event theory: sounds are events where both
the sources and the surroundingmediumare necessary components. He claims
that “a sound is the event of an object or interacting bodies disturbing a sur-
rounding medium in a wavelike manner”8.
To stress the difference between their position and O’Callaghan’s, Casati and
Dokic submit the above-mentioned variation of Berkeley’s thought experiment.
Their version is more complex and involves two extra elements that are per-
ceptually relevant: the repetition of the open-and-close motion of the lid of the
jar and the temporal length of the action. Casati and Dokic suggest that in this
case perceivers would have the impression of a revealed sound that persists un-
heard when the lid is closed. Thus, O’Callaghan’s metaphysical position9 ap-
pears counter-intuitive because it implies that the sound of the tuning fork pops
into and out of existence every time the lid is opened and closed.
To support their argument, Casati and Dokic articulate three visual analo-
gies10. First, they consider a coloured object that is put into a dark room and
then brought to the light: normally, it looks like colours are revealed to per-
ceivers. Second, they compare the tuning fork in the jar to other two cases of
visual tunnel effect: a circle moving behind a screen and the switching on-and-
off of the light in a refrigerator when we open and close its door. Their point
is that, if there is nothing wrong in assuming the existence of unperceived vi-
sual objects, the same can be said regarding sounds in a vacuum that are not
actually heard. Furthermore, they consider the vacuum in the jar as like other
ordinary unfavourable conditions of hearing: those adverse circumstances don’t
affect the nature and the existence of the perceived entities. Hence, the lack of
information, deriving from the absence of themedium, doesn’t involve the non-
existence of a sound.
On the contrary, O’Callaghan’s goal is to show that the presence of amedium
is not only a condition for veridical sound perception, but also for the existence
of sounds themselves. His reasoning11 can be reconstructed as follow: (i) Casati
andDokic’s visual analogies do notwork; (ii) A better visual analogy about indis-
tinguishable objects leads to conflicting intuitions; (iii) Those intuitions are not
useful at the metaphysical level, but only at the perceptual level; (iv) The func-
tioning of perception is not the issue here; (v) The absence of audible qualities
in a vacuum provides philosophical reasons to maintain that the presence of a
medium is a necessary condition for the existence of sounds.
7See Casati and Dokic (1994, pp. 44-46, 61-64). See also Casati and Dokic (2009, ch. 5).
8See O’Callaghan (2007, p. 110).
9This is true also for the medial waves theories.
10See Casati and Dokic (1994, pp. 42-44), Casati and Dokic (1998, pp. 36-37), Casati and Dokic
(2010).
11See O’Callaghan (2007, pp. 49-55).
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O’Callaghan supports (i) by pointing out that sounds, unlike colours, do not
appear as features or properties of objects that persist unchanged in time. In ad-
dition, he stresses that silence ordinarily signals the conclusion of a sound and
allows the beginning of another. Instead, darkness seems to be a barrier behind
which objects and their colours can continue to exist. Obscurity is more akin to
a sufficiently intense sound that does not allow us to hear anything else. Also,
O’Callaghan suggests to compare the case of the tuning fork in the jar with a
situation where an object disappears completely from a perceiver’s visual field
and, then, an indiscernible copy of it reappears in front of her. Given that this
situation does not lead to univocal reactions, O’Callaghan can find support for
(ii). It is also possible to argue that the moving circle and the refrigerator light
pop into and out of existence, regardless of the fact that they are perceived as
continuously present behind the white screen and the closed door. Even if we
consider these two cases good analogues of the jar situation, O’Callaghan’s po-
sition that sounds do not exist in a vacuum is not disproved despite Casati and
Dokic’s opposite perceptual intuitions.
Fromwhat we have stated above, it is possible to conclude that studying the
reactions to various visual and auditory situations can say something about the
functioning of perception, but not so much about the ontological nature of the
entities that are perceived (iii). O’Callaghan, like Berkeley, recognises that it is
not possible to obtain empirical refutations or confirmations of the presence of
sounds in a vacuum, but, unlike Berkeley, he tries to find reasons to deny their
existence by focusing on the metaphysical level (iv). For this reason, he focuses
on the demonstration of the necessity of amedium, regardless of Casati andDo-
kic’s thought experiment.
According to the standardphysical theory and to somecommonunderstand-
ing of sounds, the qualities (pitch, timbre and loudness) of sounds depend on
the surroundingmedium: this implies that a vibrating eventwithout a surround-
ingmaterial does not present any audible qualities (v). Unless a special category
of sounds that hasno standardqualities exists, the tuning fork in a vacuumemits
no sounds. While the light doesn’t change objects’ visual qualities, the medium
seems to play a more substantial role in defining sounds’ properties. This is
shown by the fact that it is possible to specify standard visual conditions (the
full spectrum of light) that reveal the genuine colours of objects, while a similar
set of standard conditions cannot be found for the auditory world12. It is impor-
tant to point out that the necessity of the medium for the existence of sounds
does not imply that they exist entirely in the surroundingmaterials. For this rea-
son, O’Callaghan’s theory of sounds does not collapse into amechanisticmedial
theory.
Even if the caseof sounds inavacuumis consideredaclassic argumentagainst
12O’Callaghan would have done well to provide more details about these last two points.
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mechanistic theories of sounds and it creates problems for a hybrid theory that
take into account both the source and the surrounding medium, it cannot be
decisive from ametaphysical point of view. Nevertheless, Berkeley’s thought ex-
periment and its latter-day versions remain an interesting field where theories
and intuitions about hearing can be tested.
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